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Abstract
The privatization of air traffic control (ATC) is one possible way to reduce the
cost, increase the efficiency, and speed the innovation of ATC in the United States.
However, studies from other countries in which ATC services have been privatized
show mixed results in these areas and have often involved imposing some kind of
fee-for-service pricing system. Furthermore, analyses of privatization efforts in
other areas of government demonstrate that such efforts have been controversial
and have not always resulted in lower service delivery costs. Therefore, a possible
alternative would be to focus on reorganizing the FAA and consolidating services
such as approach controls and en route centers.
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Introduction
Privatization of air traffic control services1, though possible, may or may not
provide benefits in the areas of efficiency, cost, or innovation. Ascertaining whether
or not these benefits would result from privatization requires analyzing the results
of other government privatization ventures and looking past ideological arguments
to determine the potential costs to aviation stakeholders and the general public and
whether these costs justify privatization of air traffic control services.
The central question regarding privatization of air traffic control or any other
service is not whether or not it can be done. Instead, the pertinent question is
whether or not it should be done. Examples of ATC privatization in other countries
(Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia, for example) demonstrate that cost to
the public does not necessarily decrease unless user fees are adopted and rapid
adoption of new technologies can lead to service disruptions. Also, efficiency may or
may not improve as a result of private-sector provision of service.
This is not to say that privatization in general cannot accomplish the goals it
sets out to achieve; rather, in the specific case of ATC it may not be the best method.
As will be discussed below, the efficacy of privatization depends largely on the
nature of the service to be privatized and the ability of government organizations to
develop strong contracts that addresses issues such as cost, acceptable outcomes,
and accountability. Proponents of privatizing ATC say that cost of the service would
decrease due to market pressures, efficiency would improve through removing
bureaucratic barriers to hiring, staffing and pay rates, and innovation would
1 Air traffic control services include 3 areas of service provision: terminal (tower and approach/departure facilities), en route
(air route traffic control center facilities), and flight service.
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improve by allowing the private company to develop and purchase technology.
Opponents to privatization counter that cost has not always decreased in other
countries, the possibility of reduced wages or staffing could have a detrimental
effect on safety, potential user fees would depress air travel, and rapid technological
development could result in service outages that impact safety.

Statement of the Problem
The problem this study intends to examine is whether or not privatizing
government services actually improves efficiency of the service or decreases cost.
On the issue of cost, we might further ask: decrease cost to whom? It is
possible that the cost to the government might be decreased through privatization,
and therefore to the public in general through reduced taxes. But cost to individual
users might increase if a fee-for-service structure was implemented, which may not
benefit the public if it causes users to reduce or eliminate services that benefit the
public.
Using an extensive literature review, examples of privatization of
government services in the US will be presented along with their impacts on the
areas listed above. The impacts of privatization of ATC in other countries will also
be examined, along with the privatization of some ATC components in the US,
namely Flight Service Stations (FSS) and the partial privatization of air traffic
control towers under the Federal Contract Tower Program (FCT). The thoughts of
ATC managers and specialists in the US and other countries will also be discussed.
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Research Questions
The main research question for this study is, “Would privatizing air traffic
control in the United States lead to lower system costs and greater efficiency?”
Secondary research questions would are:
a. What is the goal of privatizing government services?
b. What do studies on other government privatization efforts in the US
demonstrate?
c. Would there be any measurable differences between a privatized system
and the current system?
d. What are current federal air traffic controllers’ opinions on
privatization?

Literature Review
According to the Congressional Research Service (2006), privatization is “the
use of the private sector in the provision of a good or service, the components of
which include financing, operations (supplying, production, delivery), and quality
control.” Thus privatization can take many forms, such as hiring a private janitorial
company to clean a federal courthouse, a state Department of Motor Vehicles branch
purchasing office supplies from a local vendor, the US Air Force contracting with
Boeing to design a new aircraft, or the Department of Justice contracting with a
software company to develop a new database program. In some cases, such as with
Flight Service Stations, the entire service is contracted out to private companies.
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The ideological underpinning of privatization is that the private sector will
result in less cost for taxpayers and will be more efficient due to the nature of
market forces and competition. Sclar (2000) says that this belief is rooted in the
concept of the standard market model, an economic model that assumes a level
playing field for all actors (buyers and sellers) and an inherent drive towards
profitability and efficiency through competition and market forces. Though
interesting in a theoretical sense, the standard market model may not be ideal for
describing real-world economics:
The gaping intellectual hole in this formulation is that it is too simple…in a
world where market information is less than complete, markets are less
competitive than the ideal, and market participants are complex
organizations instead of individuals, the model provides no way to predict
how these complex actors will respond to any given market signal…Basing a
policy intended to change organizational behavior on a theory that
disregards all real-world complexity can and…does lead policy makers to use
public contracting inappropriately (47).
In other words, the standard market model assumes a level playing field but in fact
some players have access to information that others do not, one company may be
better positioned to provide a service than another, or any number of other
inequalities can exist in the real marketplace.
Many services at all levels of government (federal, state and local) either
have been privatized or are being considered for privatization. Examples include
state highway maintenance in Massachusetts (Sclar, 2000), prisons in Arizona
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(Isaacs, 2012 and Kenny and Gilroy, 2013), Flight Service Stations, and firefighting
services in Scottsdale, Arizona (Sclar, 2000). Privatization of other government
services such as Social Security and Air Traffic Control have also been proposed in
recent years.
From 2000 to 2006, spending on federal contracts to private companies
increased from $256 billion to $415 billion, an increase of 69.1% (Edwards and
Filion, 2009). In the same time period, Edwards and Filion (2009) found that
contract employees increased from 1.4 million to 2 million, compared to 2.7 million
federal employees, demonstrating that 43% of people doing work for the
government were actually employed by private businesses. What have been the
results of some government privatization efforts at the local, state and federal
levels?

Arizona Prison System
Arizona began privatizing its prison system in the early 1990s as a response
to overcrowding and increasing costs of inmate care, facility maintenance, and the
construction of new facilities. Due to inexpensive land and favorable politics,
several private prison operators soon opened facilities in Arizona. Other states also
began transporting prisoners to Arizona in order to ease their own overcrowding
problems. By 2010 just over 20 percent of Arizona’s prisoners were housed in
private facilities (Isaacs, 2012).
Controversy has resulted over the cost of the privatized prison services.
According to studies by the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC), in 2008 the
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state overpaid private prison operators by $248,098 for minimum security
prisoners and $3,577,580 for medium security prisoners2 for a total loss of
$3,925,768. The numbers were almost the same for 2009, and in 2010 the
overpayment declined, with a total deficit of $2,736,245 (Isaacs, 2012).
New York Times reporter Richard Oppel (2011) researched the Arizona
prison issue and found similar budget problems. One reason he cites is that private
prisons avoid taking inmates with extensive medical requirements.
Five of eight private prisons serving Arizona did not accept inmates with
“limited physical capacity and stamina” or severe physical illness or chronic
conditions…None took inmates with “high need” mental health conditions.
Some inmates who became sick were “returned to state prisons due to an
increase of their medical scores that exceeds contractual exclusions (3).
This leads to significant costs for the state government, which by law must provide
necessary medical services for inmates. Oppel (2011) says that because private
prison operators only take healthier inmates, state inmate medical costs are an
average of one-third higher than for private inmates.
Kenny and Gilroy (2013) disagree, stating that differences between private
and public budgeting and accounting systems make comparing costs difficult. They
contend that these differences conceal true cost savings by not taking into account,
for example, that certain risk-management and other administrative costs may
come out of other state agency budgets, so while the ADOC may not spend that
money from its budget, the state itself still shoulders the total cost. Kenny and

2

The state retained control of its maximum-security prisons.
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Gilroy also argue that the ADOC report does not provide a system-wide analysis
because it only averaged costs from a handful of public and private prison facilities
instead of looking at the entire system. Since costs can vary considerably from one
facility to another, this results in a skewed analysis. When correcting for “many of
the factors” found deficient in the ADOC study, another study found that privatized
prisons were saving the state between 14.3 and 22.3 percent over the long term
(Kenny and Gilroy, 2013).
This example is instructive when examining the possibility of ATC
privatization because in this case a state took a previously government-operated
system and contracted it out to a private company. Depending on how the numbers
are analyzed, it seems the state is either saving or losing money on the deal, but
obviously it is not a clear-cut advantage to the state at least in financial terms. Also,
the private prison company is allowed under the contract to pick and choose which
prisoners it takes in some circumstances, such as health status, and because of this
has the option to reject unhealthy prisoners that will cost it too much money. This
illustrates the danger of allowing a contractor too much power to do what it wants
to do, as opposed to what is in the best interests of the state (and by extension,
taxpayers).

Roads and Maintenance
Government at the city, state or county level often considers privatizing
roads or portions of roads and contracting out for construction and other upkeep.
For example, in 1992 the state of Massachusetts began privatizing highway
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maintenance. MassHighway, the state organization responsible for road
maintenance, estimated the total cost of the services to be privatized at $4.08
million for Essex County (Sclar, 2000). The estimate was not disclosed when the
bidding process began and bids for the contract varied considerably, but the lowest
bidder at $3.7 million was awarded the contract.
Although the governor, who campaigned on a platform of reducing
government size and spending, and his administration hailed the privatization effort
as a success, others found problems with the cost and quality of the work. Because
of a lack of government oversight and deficiencies in the language of the contract,
the private contractor was allowed to set its own work priorities, some of which
included obligations to projects in other counties and states. A field audit found that
some work such as mowing, sweeping, and cleaning drainage systems either was
not done at all or was incompletely done (Sclar, 2000).
A State Auditor’s report on the cost of privatization in Essex County
determined that the state actually spent $1.15 million more for the privatized
service than if MassHighway performed the work (State Auditor’s Report on the
Privatization of the Maintenance of State Roads in Essex County, 1995). The
governor’s administration hired a private firm to do another analysis, and their
findings were that the state saved $2.5 million by using the contracted services
(Coopers and Lybrand, 1996). Sclar (2000) finds that unresolved discrepancies in
the calculation of personnel costs, estimated prices, work done by state employees
versus contract employees, and the final cost of the project renders the true
financial impact of the privatization effort inconclusive.
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A privatization success story is the Chicago Skyway, a toll road that was sold
in 1995 for $1.8 billion for a 99-year lease (Thornton, 2007). It was jointly
purchased by Macquarie Infrastructure Group of Australia and the Spanish company
Cintra. Privatizing public infrastructure is popular for cash-strapped state and local
governments, and with private companies that see monopolistic advantages to the
“rich cash flows that roads, bridges, airports, parking garages, and shipping ports
generate.” However, there can be a downside to leasing or selling public
infrastructure: “[other types of contract] deals typically play out over 5 to 10 years;
infrastructure deals run for decades… with captive customers, the cash flows are
virtually guaranteed” (Thornton, 2007). Indeed, tolls on the Skyway could be as
high as $5 by 2017. Nevertheless, the speed of maintenance and other
improvements has increased considerably in this case.
As these examples demonstrate, once again financial savings under private
contract are inconclusive. Did MassHighway save or lose money under
privatization? It seems to depend on who is doing the accounting. Chicago is
benefiting from the lease of the Chicago Skyway, as maintenance and road
improvements have been accomplished as promised. However, the city has turned
over control of part of its infrastructure to a private company until the year 2094.
How this will affect users over the lifetime of the contract is unclear. Will prices
increase? Will the companies who made the purchase still be in business after 50,
75, or 90 years? What happens to the Skyway if the private contractor does go out
of business or merges with another organization?
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Scottsdale Fire Department
Scottsdale, Arizona has utilized the services of a private firefighting company,
Rural/Metro, since 1948. Though many cities explore the feasibility of private
firefighting due to the large costs associated with providing the service, sometimes
more than 20% of a city’s budget (Sclar, 2000), few have done it with the apparent
success of Scottsdale.
Rural/Metro’s services were retained as the city grew and the company is
now the sole provider of fire services for Scottsdale and some other surrounding
communities. It holds a firefighting monopoly in the area: in lieu of competitive
bidding, the city negotiates an exclusive annual contract with the company. Despite
Rural/Metro’s long history with the city of Scottsdale, the services provided are not
significantly better or cheaper than a traditional municipal fire department.
Sclar (2000) cites two studies: the first in, 1976, compared Scottsdale’s fire
protection costs with those of three neighboring communities and found that
Scottsdale’s costs were one-third to one-half less than all of the other cities. The
second study, in 1989, showed that Scottsdale’s costs had increased significantly
and was now identical to one of the other cities and only 25-30 percent less than the
other two cities. He suggests that the increase in costs reflects an increase in
population density, and that firefighting service cost is dependent more on the
geographical distribution of population and less on who is providing the service. Or,
in other words, firefighting costs are the same in higher population-density areas for
both private and public providers.
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Airports
Airport privatization in the United States has not, so far, been as popular or
successful as in other countries. In fact, nearly every commercial airport in the US is
owned and operated by states, local governments, or municipal authorities (Poole
and Edwards, 2010).
The Airport Privatization Pilot Program was largely the result of the efforts
of privatization lobbyists (Poole and Edwards, 2010). Congress passed the law in
1996, which allowed up to five US airports to apply for forgiveness of previous
federal grant obligations, keep the proceeds of lease or sale agreements, and receive
ownership of property acquired with federal assistance. The 2012 Reauthorization
Act increased the number of airports allowed under the program from 5 to 10 (FAA,
2014). One airport can be a major hub, and one must be a general aviation airport.
The purpose of the program is to see what the impacts of privatization would be at
the airports in the program in order to determine the benefits and costs on a larger
scale.
So far only a single airport went forward with privatization under the
program. Stewart International Airport in Newburgh, NY participated in the
program from March 2000-October 2007 under a 99-year lease agreement with the
UK-based transportation company National Express Group (Poole and Edwards,
2010). The airport did not receive the necessary 65 percent approval from its
tenant airlines, and so the state of New York had to use the revenue for airport
improvements and maintenance. The lease was terminated by mutual consent in
part because of the revenue problems and because National Express wished to focus
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more on its rail and bus services (Poole and Edwards, 2010). Airport ownership
reverted to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
To date, only two commercial airports are actively pursuing privatization
under the FAA’s Airport Privatization Pilot Program: Luis Munoz Marin
International Airport in San Juan, Puerto Rico (a US protectorate), and Hendry
County Airglades Airpark in Clewiston, Florida. Eight other airports, including
Chicago Midway and Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport, have
either withdrawn applications or had their applications terminated (FAA, 2014).
Privatization of airports in the US has faced three main challenges, according
to testimony before the House Subcommittee on Aviation3 (GAO, 1996). First, many
of the services at airports are already owned or operated by private companies, like
restaurants, janitorial services, retail stores, fuel services, aircraft handling and
storage, and of course airlines. In 1996, less than three percent of employees at the
three major airports operated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
(Newark, LaGuardia, and JFK) were public employees. Second, as recipients of
federal grants, airports generally cannot use revenue for things other than capital or
operating costs (GAO, 1996) and municipalities cannot use proceeds from the sale
or lease of an airport for their general funds (Poole and Edwards, 2010). Therefore
the sale or lease of an airport to a private company could raise significant legal
challenges and would be of dubious financial benefit to the city or state in question.
Third, stakeholders have concerns over what the implications of airport
privatization could mean in terms of user fees. If private airports were to be
3

Testimony by Gerald L. Dillingham, Associate Director, Transportation and Telecommunications Issues, Resources,
Community, and Economic Development Division.
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ineligible for certain kinds of federal money, the airport would likely need to
increase landing fees, fuel surcharges, rates for renting terminal gates or retail
space, and so on.
Airlines, concerned about increased fees and issues related to the solvency
and longevity of a privately-owned airport, as well as possibly losing influence when
it comes to lease terms and construction and improvement projects at airports, have
lobbied against privatization efforts, including the 1996 Airport Privatization Pilot
Program (Poole and Edwards, 2010). Though unsuccessful at preventing the
passage of the program, the airlines did secure a provision that requires 65 percent
of airline tenants at an airport to agree to any sale or lease agreements.

FAA Flight Service Stations
In February of 2005 the Federal Aviation Administration awarded a contract
for operations of most Flight Service Stations4 to Lockheed Martin (LM), a defense
and security contractor for a 5-year contract period (with an option for up to 5
additional years). Flight Service Stations provide a number of services to pilots
(primarily GA), including preflight weather briefings, en route weather information,
filing and termination of IFR and VFR flight plans, and assistance with search and
rescue. LM began providing services on October 4, 2005,
The FAA expects to save $1.7 billion to $2.2 billion (Department of
Transportation [DOT], 2007) over the life of the contract, an estimated 20 percent
savings over FAA-provided service (Durden, 2005). However, after LM faced
4 The FAA retained control of FSS in Alaska.
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numerous problems rolling out the service the company requested an additional 10
percent above the contracted price from the FAA, or about $170 million (Durden,
2005). In addition to guaranteed rates paid under the contract, LM can earn bonuses
for meeting operational objectives: for example, in 2006 the company earned an
additional $6 million for meeting some of its performance objectives. However, LM
can also be fined for not meeting objectives: that same year, the company was fined
$8.9 million for failing to meet other key performance measures (DOT, 2007).
The savings over FAA–provided service stem from consolidation of 58 FSS
facilities to three hub facilities and 15 stand-alone facilities, a modernized end-toend computer operating system for processing flight plans, weather information and
communications across all FSS facilities and hubs, and eliminating approximately
900 employees as a result of the new computer system and facility consolidation
(DOT, 2007).
Since 2005 the service has improved greatly and LM was awarded a contract
extension worth $221 million for two years (Marketwatch, 2013), but at the
beginning of the initial contract period the transition did not go smoothly.
Department of Transportation (2007) found that LM was not meeting 13 of 21
performance measures. Issues included inadequate staffing and long delays in
developing and implementing its new computer operating system. Despite the
operating system not being completely operational, it was taken live and the result
was lost flight plans, dropped phone calls, incomplete weather briefings, and other
problems (DOT, 2007). As of 2007 most issues had been resolved and the system
now appears to be working as intended.
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The FAA retains regulatory authority over LM. It regularly reviews
recordings, evaluates facilities, audits weather briefings, and oversees a group of
Quality Assurance Evaluators who ensure LM is meeting service objectives
(Washington, 2007). As mentioned above, the FAA has the authority to provide
bonuses and levy fines if LM meets or falls short of performance objectives. An
example of performance measures is abandoned calls: by the contract, the
abandoned call rate is 7% or less (Washington, 2007). This kind of oversight is
important because as DOT (2007) points out,
Although the Agency [FAA] has outsourced the day-to-day operations of its
flight services, it is still ultimately responsible for the services that these
facilities provide to general aviation users of the National Airspace System.
Therefore, FAA needs effective controls in place over its contractor to ensure
that the quality of services is maintained and that the estimated savings are
achieved (4).

Contracting FSS to a private entity appears to be a success story thus far, at
least in terms of service provision. Flight plans are being filed, pilots are getting
weather briefings, and notices to airmen (NOTAMS)5 and pilot reports (PIREPS)6 are
being filed and disseminated. In terms of economic savings, however, the success of
privatization is not yet known. The FAA originally estimated a $2.2 billion savings
over 10 years, but the inspector general of the DOT (2007) puts the estimate of
5 NOTAMS include information on airport closures, runway and taxiway construction, closed or restricted airspace,
navigational aids out of service, and many other pieces of information that pilots may need to know for a flight.
6 A PIREP is pilot-reported weather conditions such as icing or turbulence and are of great value because unlike a forecast it is
real-time information.
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actual savings closer to $1.7 billion. Still a considerable sum, but $500 million less
than previously anticipated. The inspector general also points out that most of the
contract savings are “expected to be achieved in the later years of the contract,”
which requires the FAA to be vigilant to ensure that savings estimates are being met
during each year of the contract. Interestingly, Washington (2007) anticipates the
savings to be achieved over a 13-year period instead of the 10 provided by the
contract (5 years guaranteed, 5 optional).
The greatest expense seems to be labor, which may reduce anticipated
savings even further. During the period reviewed by the DOT (2007), LM had
requested an additional $102 million because it felt that the FAA had withheld
actual labor costs during the bidding process. In 2006, the Department of Labor, at
LM’s request, analyzed the wage rates for Flight Service Specialists and issued a pay
scale that significantly increased pay for newly-hired specialists. The FAA appealed
the decision but that appeal was denied in 2007. LM is expected to continue seeking
adjustments to the contract for issues relating to labor costs (DOT, 2007). The
actual transition from FAA to contractor-provided service also incurred significant
cost, $150 million in 2005 alone (US House of Representatives, 2006), further
eroding actual savings of the privatization effort. The final cost savings will not be
known until the end of the contract period.
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Federal Contract Air Traffic Towers (FCT)
The FAA began the FCT program by contracting out a five small VFR towers7 in
1982. The program grew in following years, to 27 towers in 1993 and to 250 towers
in 2012 (Guzzetti, 2012). FCTs are a mixture of towers fully funded by the FAA,
some that operate under a cost-sharing program8, and a handful operated by the Air
National Guard.
Controllers at contract towers must be FAA-certified and meet certain
eligibility requirements such as maintaining medical certification. They must also
adhere to applicable FAA regulations. Contract controllers are typically retired FAA
controllers9, ex-military controllers, or controllers who have left the FAA for other
reasons (T. Baribeau, personal communication, January 17th, 2013). Each facility is
evaluated for safety and regulatory compliance and facility managers must conduct
regular internal audits that evaluate operations and performance.
The contract period from February 1, 2010 to September 30, 2014 was worth
almost $600 million, $138 million of which was requested for FY 2013 (Guzzetti,
2012). The Congressional Research Service (Moore, 2000) found that the FCT
program saved the FAA $250,000 per tower in yearly operating costs. An Office of
Inspector General Audit Report in 2012 (Guzzetti, 2012) found that “the average
contract tower [costs] about $1.5 million less to operate than a comparable FAA
tower.” The American Association of Airport Executives (2013) says that in FY
7

A VFR tower is one that provides strictly VFR services to aircraft. Controllers cannot provide any services such as vectoring
or provide IFR separation services. IFR aircraft may still land or depart from the airport and the airport can have instrument
approaches, but all IFR services are provided by the approach control or ARTCC that has jurisdiction outside the tower’s
airspace.
8 Under this program, an airport sponsor must provide some funding for the tower and the FAA must provide at least 80% of
the remaining costs based on a cost-benefit ratio analysis. Cost-sharing allows towers to operate that would not otherwise
qualify under the contract program.
9 FAA-employed controllers are required to retire at age 56, but this restriction does not apply to contract tower controllers.
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2012, the FCTs “handled 28 percent of all US tower operations (14.8 million
operations10), but accounted for just 14 percent (approximately $133 million) of the
FAA’s overall budget allotted to air traffic control tower operations.” The US
Contract Tower Association (USCTA, 2013) cited a study showing that “the typical
low-activity FAA tower costs 3.77 times as much to operate as a comparable
contract tower.”

Air Traffic Control in Other Countries
Several countries have privatized their ATC services to varying degrees,
including Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and
Switzerland. Whether these systems are successful or not depends on the study in
question.
Adams (2005) finds that amongst Australia, Germany, New Zealand and
Switzerland, “two indicated a decrease in ATC operating cost, one subject showed an
increase in ATC operating cost, and one subject showed no change in operating
cost.” Others disagree with the findings on cost. NATCA (2002) and Sclar (2003)
point out that the UK system was bailed out twice by the British government, at a
cost of $131 million. Staffing shortages in the UK resulted in “a single case of a
controller on sick leave [that] precipitated the closure of a 200-mile belt of airspace”
(NATCA, 2002). Sclar (2003) adds that in Canada user fees for passengers have
increased to $22 per segment in 2002. He also notes that “cost saving work rules
have so infuriated controllers in Australia that a series of strikes have crippled air
10

An operation is a landing, takeoff, or overflight of an aircraft through tower airspace. An aircraft that does 3 touch-and-go’s
would therefore count as six operations: one for each landing and one for each takeoff.
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traffic movement for hours at a time,” and problems with new technology there
have led to radar blackouts and traffic disruptions.
Management and labor representatives from Canada, the United Kingdom,
and Australia discussed some issues relating to privatization at a recent conference
in the United States11. Dr. David Harrison, Safety Director for National Air Traffic
Services UK (NATS) said that both service and safety had improved since the
privatization of the UK system, citing around twelve losses of separation per year
prior to 2001 and only one since then (NATCA, 2014). John Crichton, President and
CEO of NAVCANADA said Canada went from a system plagued by wage freezes, cost
overruns, and service deterioration to one that is more stable and self-sustaining.
Despite conflict during the first few years of privatization, relations between labor
and management have improved significantly, with a more-engaged workforce and
a strong labor contract. Crichton said safety under the new system had improved by
at least 50% (NATCA, 2014), although he did not elaborate on exactly what was
wrong before or what had improved. Greg Hood, General Manager of Airservices
Australia, did not comment specifically on safety after privatization versus before
but did say that Airservices Australia and the controller’s union there have been
making a great deal of progress on changing institutional culture as it relates to
safety (NATCA, 2014).
Each member of the panel was asked about myths surrounding government
versus private sector service provision. Harrison (UK) said people believed that the
private company would be less safe than the government, but the opposite
11 Communicating for Safety 2014, in Las Vegas, held on March 24-26 2014.
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happened. He also said people were worried about funding, but that improved as
well. Crichton (Canada) said people were afraid the private sector “would screw it
up” (NATCA, 2014). Greg Myles, President of the Canadian Air Traffic Control
Association, the union representing controllers there, said his members were
worried about job security and lay-offs, but those issues did not materialize. Daryl
Hickey, President of Civil Air Australia, a controller’s union, said people were
concerned about safety oversight and regulations but that those areas are
improving.
In each of those three countries, the government mainly serves as safety
regulator of the private organizations. Each organization is slightly different in how
it operates. NATS is a public/private partnership with the UK’s Civil Aviation
Authority and is a board-governed, profit-making entity (in fact none of the ATC
providers in these countries are non-profit). NAVCANADA is a non-share capital
organization, which means there are no shareholders but the company is free to
make as much profit as it likes providing that money is used within the organization
(NATCA, 2014). Airservices Australia is expected to provide a profit for the
Australian government (NATCA, 2014). All three organizations are funded through
user fees.

User Fees
“User fees” basically means the user of a service pays directly for that service,
just like buying a product in a store. Currently in the United States, airline
passengers and aircraft operators do not pay the US government anything extra for
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the air traffic control services they receive during their flight. All citizens pay for the
service indirectly through income and other taxes paid to the federal government.
Some find this arrangement unfair, and believe the people who utilize the service
should be the ones who pay for the service. One counter-argument is that ATC is an
enabler of economic activity from which all citizens benefit, and it is better for many
people to pay a small amount than for a few to pay higher prices.
User fees are one possible way for a privatized ATC system to be funded,
though they are not the only way. As discussed above, Lockheed-Martin with Flight
Service and the companies that operate Federal Contract Towers are paid by the
federal government out of tax revenue. But the strongest argument for a cheaper,
more cost-effective ATC system seems to be a move to user fees, which is what has
happened in other countries.
Robert Poole of the Reason Foundation, a libertarian think-tank, says
“shifting from aviation taxes to direct user payments for ATC services is the essential
precondition for commercialization [another term for privatization]. It frees ATC
from the federal budget process and other federal constraints, while providing a
bondable revenue stream to facilitate needed modernization investment” (Poole,
2006). In his view, funding from the federal government through a contract is not
enough because this renders the private organization vulnerable to government
budget problems, such as what happened during the government shutdown in
201312. Other nations seem to agree with this view.

12 During the shutdown, federal contract towers were nearly closed since even though they are operated by private
companies, their funding still comes from the federal government.
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NAVCANADA and Airservices Australia assess a number of different fees,
depending on whether an aircraft is IFR or VFR13, operating in certain classes of
airspace, or operating out of certain types of airports. Charges are broadly based on
aircraft weight14, distance flown, and if under VFR or IFR. Airports in those
countries charge also landing fees based on weight. In Australia each airport has
different landing fees. For example, Melbourne, as of 2008 charges $5.0615 per
metric ton (Airservices Australia, 2010). It should be noted, however, that
Australia’s largest airports (Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney)
charge a minimum landing fee of $21.00 (thus large aircraft benefit from a lower
per-ton fee but small aircraft pay higher fees). Instead of going airport-by-airport,
Canada assesses a Terminal Service Charge that is calculated using a base charge
multiplied by the aircraft’s weight in metric tons. The current base charge is $23.90
(NAVCANADA, 2013) and is applied only at the departure airport.
There are other charges as well. In Canada, owners of Canadian-registered
propeller aircraft must pay annual charges based on the aircraft’s weight, from $68
for aircraft weighing 0.617 to 2.0 metric tons, to $227 for those weighing 2.0 to 3.0
tons. In addition, these kinds of aircraft operating out of Canada’s large airports
(Calgary, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Toronto/Pearson, Ottawa/Macdonald, and
Montreal/Trudeau) must pay an additional $10 per day when arriving or departing
at those airports (NAVCANADA, 2013). Propeller aircraft over 3.0 metric tons and
small jet aircraft can opt to pay either a daily charge or movement-based charges.
13 Visual Flight Rules or Instrument Flight Rules, different regulations depending on weather conditions and different levels
of control and separation responsibility on the part of ATC.
14 “Weight” is defined as maximum takeoff weight.
15 All prices listed are in native currencies.
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The daily charge for propeller aircraft ranges from $42 to $2421 depending on the
aircraft’s weight, up to 21.4 metric tons, and small jet aircraft are charged $159$333. (NAVCANADA, 2013). No charges are listed for aircraft weighing more than
that, so this author assumes that for propeller aircraft weighing more than 21.4
metric tons and jet aircraft weighing more than 7.5 metric tons there is no daily
charge, only movement-based charges.
“Movement-based Charges” are fees assessed based on a base rate, times the
aircraft weight, times the distance flown (in kilometers). The base rate is $0.03445
(NAVCANADA, 2013). So for a King Air 200 with a maximum takeoff weight of 5.67
metric tons flying 200km, the charge would be $39.07. However, NAVCANADA
deducts either 65 km or 35 km from the enroute distance depending on what ATC
services are provided and the arrival and departure airport. So in this example if
the King Air was departing from an airport with approach/departure services and
arriving at an airport without those services, 100 km would be deducted from the
enroute charge for a final enroute fee of $19.53. The King Air would be subject to
the Terminal Service Charge (TSC) at the departure airport, which again is $23.90
times the aircraft weight. For the King Air, it is $23.90 x 5.67 which yields $135.51
for the departure airport, for a total trip cost of $155.04.
NAVCANADA (2013) includes some examples of larger aircraft charges. A
Boeing 747-400 roundtrip from Seattle to London transiting Canadian airspace
would be assessed oceanic and enroute charges for a total of $5416.32. An Airbus
319 roundtrip from Calgary to Vancouver would be assessed enroute and a TSC for a
total of $1,750.50.
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Australia’s fees are somewhat different. Instead of a one-time TSC,
Airservices Australia charges landing fees for each landing, practice instrument
approach, and practice instrument approach followed by a landing (Airservices
Australia, 2010). Their “Charges for Facilities and Services” guide lists each airport
along with the charge, which is based on aircraft weight, as stated above. For
example, as of 2008 landing at Darwin airport costs $2.26 per metric ton
(Airservices Australia, 2010). So if our King Air 200 landed there, the charge would
be $12.81. Darwin has an ILS16, so for a hypothetical training flight in which our
King Air flies three practice ILS approaches the total charge would be $38.43. At
Melbourne, with a charge of $5.06 per metric ton (Airservices Australia, 2010), the
same three practice ILS approaches would cost $86.07. At Essendon airport, where
the landing fee is $12.69 per metric ton (Airservices Australia, 2010), the practice
session would cost $215.86.
Airservices Australia (2010) also assesses a fee for Aviation Rescue and Fire
Fighting (if available at the airport in question) based on aircraft weight in metric
tons for each landing, practice instrument approach, or practice instrument
approach followed by a landing. Our King Air would therefore be assessed an
additional fee of $1.81 per landing at Darwin (for a total of $43.86) and Melbourne
($91.50), but not at Essendon because no such service is available at that airport.
Australian enroute charges are assessed whenever all or part of a flight is
conducted under IFR. No enroute charge is assessed to VFR flights (Airservices
Australia, 2010). The formula for aircraft weighing up to 20 metric tons is the base
16 Instrument Landing System, a system that allows aircraft to navigate to a runway in low-visibility conditions.
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rate x distance/100 x weight. For aircraft over 20 metric tons: base rate x
distance/100 x square root of weight. The King Air 200, weighing 5.67 metric tons,
would be charged under the first formula. For a flight from Melbourne to Brisbane
(1266 km), the charge would be $0.93 x 1266/100 x 5.67 for an enroute charge of
$66.76. Airservices Australia, like NAVCANADA, deducts a portion of enroute
charges (55 km) based on whether control services exist at the departure or arrival
airports. In our example, 110 km was deducted for the departure and arrival
airports. If an IFR aircraft takes off and lands at the same airport with no landings
anywhere else, it is charged for a 100 km flight.
Operators of aircraft weighing less than 2.5 metric tons can opt for a “Light
Aircraft Option” annual payment based on the number of flights an aircraft operator
expects to make. The payment covers either the terminal navigation facilities and
services or both the terminal navigation facilities and services plus enroute charges
and range from $87-$2070 (Airservices Australia, 2010).
The effect of user fees, at least in Australia, has been profound. Since 1990
hours flown per year for private/business flights have decreased from
approximately 575,000 in 1990 to 400,000 in 2003 (Matthews, 2007). Some
aircraft owners object to the multitude of fees, which also include $145 for a
required Aviation Security ID Card and $75 for a medical certificate, on top of
whatever the aviation medical examiner charges (Matthews, 2007). Due to the feefor-service nature of aviation in Australia, Airservices Australia is very aggressive
with inspections, audits, and enforcement, with fines for any infractions found.
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Additionally, “any breach of Australian aviation law is administered under the
criminal code” (Matthews, 2007).
At present, the US Government assesses the following basic taxes for
domestic aviation: a 7.5% Domestic Passenger Ticket Tax (based on ticket price), a
Domestic Flight Segment Tax ($3.90 per passenger, per segment as of 2013 and not
applicable at certain airports), a Domestic Cargo/Mail Tax of 6.25%, and fuel taxes.
Fuel taxes are charged as follows: a General Aviation Fuel Tax of $0.193/gallon for
avgas, $0.218/gallon for jet fuel, and $0.141/gallon for fractionally owned aircraft.
Finally, a Commercial Fuel Tax of $0.043/gallon.
The King Air 200 from the examples above, operating in the United States,
would be subject to fuel taxes and possibly other taxes if it is used for passenger or
cargo services, but would not be subject to any other fees for air navigation services.
Tax revenue from the 7.5% ticket tax has been steadily declining as airline
ticket prices have dropped over the past several years, negatively impacting the
FAA’s budget (Poole and Edwards, 2010). Poole and Edwards (2010) and Poole
(2006) argue that increasing federal funding to the FAA is virtually impossible due
to the political situation in Washington, nor is it desirable because of the potentially
negative impact it could have on the federal budget. Of course, politicians generally
are reluctant to increase taxes and the various aviation taxes listed above are no
exception.
Would a shift to user fees cost travelers and aircraft operators more or less
than the current tax structure? This is a significant question, as we have seen a
steady decrease in business aviation in Australia since user fees were introduced
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there. Indeed, in the US, “the underlying concern is that replacing the traditional
fuel tax with fees based on the cost of service and the amount used would increase
the cost of flying, putting the viability of general aviation at risk” (Poole, 2006, 15).
In his analysis of the potential impact of user fees on business jet travel, Poole
(2006) found that the costs would vary if a weight/distance model is used, such as
in Canada or Australia. For corporate-owned jets user fees would be higher in every
kind of fee structure considered. For fractionally owned jets the costs would usually
be less, and charter users would pay less under each fee structure considered.
Despite the cost increase for corporate users, he proposes that better air route
structuring and increased efficiency of a privatized ATC system would reduce
overall operating costs for all users by reducing delay and consequently flight hours
and fuel consumption:
…a fee structured like that of NAVCANADA could cost [fractional and charter]
users about one-third less per year than the current aviation excise tax
structure. And even for business jets that are part of a corporate fleet, that
type of ATC fee would be a break-even proposition, compared with today’s
fuel taxes, if the new [NextGen] ATC system reduced unnecessary flight hours
by as little as 3 to 5 percent (23).
He further contends that “nearly all current user-fee proposals call for no ATC fees
for the vast majority of piston planes…for recreational flying and mostly under VFR”
(Poole, 2006, 31). However, as shown with Canada and Australia, those aircraft can
and are charged a multitude of fees.
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The impact of user fees in the United States is uncertain at this time. All we
know is that in other countries they have resulted in higher airline ticket prices and
sometimes steep charges for general aviation users, and in Australia in particular, a
steady drop in general aviation flight hours.

Discussion
The results of this study as it relates specifically to ATC privatization are
inconclusive for several reasons. Differences in how private companies and public
agencies conduct their accounting and measure outcomes make it hard to judge
specific numbers when it comes to claims about costs or savings. The highly
partisan nature of the debate surrounding privatization also makes it hard to
evaluate the implications of some findings, and it requires readers to carefully
consider who undertook a particular study and what they or their organization are
trying to demonstrate. The fundamentally different missions of private companies
and public agencies also make it challenging to judge outcomes, as discussed below.

What is the goal of privatizing government services?
Privatization advocates cite two basic goals for moving government services
to the private sector. The first is to reduce the size of government; the second is to
provide an economic benefit. Some more extreme individuals believe that reducing
the size of government should be the ultimate end regardless of the economic
impact. But for the most part advocates, who tend to fall on the conservative end of
the political spectrum, believe that reducing the size of government inherently
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creates an economic benefit because market forces would stimulate businesses to
provide the best and cheapest products and services for consumers. Liberals, for
their part, tend to believe that government is a force for economic equality through
market regulation, the provision of services to poor or disadvantaged groups, and
by maintaining infrastructure, such as roads and bridges or airports and airways,
that is vital to the national economy and national security.
Kosar (2006) lays out the fundamental issue faced by the public when it
comes to privatization of government services:
Under the American theory of governance, political power originated
with the people, who erected government and entrusted it to use this power
in accordance with the law. Thus, the responsibility of those employed by
government is to act in accordance with this fiduciary relationship…any
effort to shift bureaucratic functions to the private sector may risk
transferring away some governing discretion into the hands of private
parties who are not accountable to the public and may not have its interests
at heart (10).
And furthermore,
The private sector firm…has one essential goal: to pursue profits; all
other goals are subordinate. Thus, it faces strong incentives to undertake
activities that promote this essential goal. This can prove beneficial to the
government, should the private firm devise more efficient means of
production and develop new products and services. This might also
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negatively affect the government, should the private firm lower its costs of
production by reducing the quality or quantity of the product or service (21).

It is tempting to argue that a private firm providing a contracted government
service would never reduce quality or quantity of a service because other firms in
the market would force it to remain competitive or risk losing the contract to
someone else, but Sclar (2000) cautions that this is often not the case. He describes
what is called the “yellow pages test:” can one open a phone book and find a list of
companies that provide a service and can compete with one another for a contract?
For things like janitorial services, landscaping, computer maintenance and so on, the
answer is likely yes. For other kinds of services, such as cable TV providers and
waste management, the answer is probably no. Sclar refers to these kinds of
services as “inherently monopolistic.” Take wastewater treatment, for example:
“because a wastewater treatment plant represents an enormous fixed capital
investment, it is most economical to construct a single plant large enough to serve
an entire community. A municipality does not build lots of small plants” (Sclar,
2000).
Even if it did, the logistics of customers moving wastewater to the treatment
plant of choice would hardly be economical. And so a municipality that wishes to
contract out wastewater treatment is essentially creating a private monopoly. In
the event that the private firm mismanages the service or fails to deliver on
provisions of the contract, the municipality has few alternatives to rectify the
problem. It could “fire” the private firm, but then what? It would bear the brunt of
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citizen dissatisfaction and would ultimately have to try and provide the service itself
or find another company to take over the contract. A likely result of this scenario is
that the municipality would not terminate the contract, but would “bail out” the
private firm to get services back on track, especially given the nature of wastewater
treatment: the municipality would not be able to let such a critical public-health
service deteriorate very far before acting. The contractor might face few, if any,
consequences for its failures. In short, the municipality bears almost all of the risk
of the contract while the private firm receives the benefits.
Sclar (2000; 2003) proposes that privatization is appropriate when the
service to be contracted out can be done competitively and with specific contract
language that lays out what the private firm is responsible for, allows the
government agency to have proper oversight, and provides for enforceable penalties
in the event the private firm fails to abide by the terms of the contract. When a
service cannot be competitively bid, government agencies should take care to
ensure that privatization is really in the best interests of the public.

What do studies on other government privatization efforts demonstrate?
As the examples in the literature review show, the effects of government
privatization efforts have been varied and controversial.
The Arizona Department of Corrections’ own research showed that it was
losing $2.7 million on privatization of prisons in 2010 (Isaacs, 2012) while Kenny
and Gilroy (2013) found that the state was actually saving 14.3-22.3 percent. The
discrepancy stems from possible differences in accounting between the ADOC and
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the private firms and the controversial practice of private firms declining to accept
inmates with health problems. The presence of such a discrepancy shows that
spending and savings figures are anything but clear-cut. Allowing private firms to
refuse prisoners with health problems could also be an example of a weak contract
that allows private companies too much leeway when it comes to one of the most
costly types of prisoners.
When Essex County, Massachusetts, privatized its highway maintenance as
part of a state-wide privatization effort, a state audit found that the contractor was
performing less work than was mandated by the contract and that the contractor
cost $1.15 million more than if the state had done the work (Sclar, 2000). The
governor’s office hired a private auditing firm, which found that the state had saved
$2.5 million (Coopers and Lybrand, 1996). The discrepancies here relate to how
prices were estimated, how personnel costs were calculated, and how work was
shared between state and contract workers.
The city of Scottsdale, Arizona has received fire protection services from a
private company since 1948. Over time the service has grown in cost as the city has
grown. One reason the company’s costs have not increased even faster relative to
surrounding communities is because its firefighters work longer hours with fewer
personnel, receive less training17, and are paid approximately $6000 per year less
than publicly employed firefighters in the region. It supplements the lower staffing
numbers with reservists and volunteers, but suffers a 20 percent turnover rate
versus almost no turnover at other municipal fire departments (Sclar, 2000).
17

Rural/Metro’s firefighters receive only EMT certification, while most firefighters traditionally receive both EMT and
paramedic certifications.
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Privatization of commercial airports, popular in other countries, has so far
failed to take off in the United States. Though the FAA launched the Airport
Privatization Pilot Program in 1996, most airports have backed out. Reasons for the
lack of success thus far include the fact that most services at airports are already
provided by private contractors, airports receive federal money for certain
maintenance and upgrade projects that could be jeopardized if the airport was
owned by a private company, and opposition from airlines and other aviation
stakeholders who fear the impact that increased fees might have on passenger
revenue. And as seen from an example of airport privatization in New York, private
companies may be inclined to walk away from a contract if they wish to focus on
other aspects of their business.
Flight Service Stations were privatized in 2005 for $1.7 billion, a 20 percent
savings over the FAA-provided service (Durden, 2005). Despite initial problems and
a bailout in the form of a 10 percent funding increase, the service functions better
now and the company was awarded a $221 million contract extension last year
(Marketwatch, 2013). The cost savings were derived in part from reducing the
number of FSS facilities from 58 to 18 (Department of Transportation, 2007). Final
cost savings are uncertain due to ongoing issues related to labor costs.
Federal Contract Towers have been in service since 1982, and today account
for 251 towers in the US (T. Baribeau, personal communication, January 17, 2013).
The last contract was worth about $600 million (Guzzetti, 2012) and the
Congressional Research Service (2000) found that FCTs saved the FAA $250,000 per
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tower per year. Guzzetti (2012) found that on average FCTs were about $1.5 million
less expensive than comparable FAA towers.
What explains the cost difference? In a word, labor. Contract tower
controllers are paid less than FAA controllers and receive fewer benefits (T.
Baribeau, personal communication, January 17, 2013). Most contract controllers
are retired FAA or ex-military controllers. What this means in practical terms is that
the FAA or the military has already paid for their training, so the contractor pays
almost nothing; it’s simply a matter of getting the person up to speed in the
particular facility at which they work. Compare that to the FAA, which in most cases
is hiring people with no ATC experience and needs from one to four years to fully
train and certify an individual18 (J. Muse, personal communication, February 4,
2014). Guzzetti (2012), in his audit of the FCT program, likewise commented that
while contract towers were cheaper to operate than comparable FAA towers, “this
cost difference is primarily due to fewer staff…who receive lower salaries.”
The studies on ATC privatization in other countries are anything but
conclusive when examining cost, innovation, and safety. In one study, only two of
four countries considered showed a decrease in operating cost (Adams, 2005). The
British government had to bail out its privatized system on two occasions at a cost
of $131 million (NATCA, 2002 and Sclar, 2003). Staffing shortages, possibly a result
of cost-cutting measures, resulted in airspace closures in the UK (NATCA, 2002) and

18

Training time depends on individual ability, traffic volume and complexity at the facility, availability of staff for training, and
other factors.
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controller strikes in Australia (Sclar, 2003) while a switch to user fees in Canada has
caused surcharges anywhere from $9 to $2019 on passenger tickets.
User fees seem a likely result of any privatization effort in the US. What form
those fees take is uncertain, but in other countries there are charges for enroute and
terminal services, and sometimes rescue/fire fighting charges, based on aircraft
weight and distance flown. Poole (2006) states that no fee system currently
proposed includes charges for recreational/VFR aircraft, but that has not been the
case elsewhere. He also believes that at least for the business jet segment of the
industry, cost increases would be offset by greater efficiency of the privatized ATC
system. Naturally, airlines and charter companies can pass the cost along to the
consumer, but recreational pilots cannot. Poole (2006) believes that efficiency
improvements from NextGen would offset any additional costs incurred from user
fees, but such improvements are not necessarily guaranteed.
What all these studies demonstrate is that the benefits of privatization are
unclear and so privatization of ATC as a way to reduce cost is not an open-and-shut
case. In fact, it is a far more complex proposition that depends on politics, who in
the private sector is able to bid for ATC, how the contract is written, the size and
complexity of the ATC system to be privatized, how employees are selected and
compensated, how fees are to be determined and collected, and any number of other
factors. None of the studies reviewed for this paper indicated how much a fully
privatized US air traffic control system would, or should, cost. The likely reason is
that there is really no way to know. FCTs appear to be less expensive (due mainly to
19

According to a ticket fare search on Air Canada’s website, there is a “Navigation surcharge” of $9, $15 or $20, based on
distance, that goes to cover fees charged by NAV Canada.
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labor costs), but one FAA study showed that fully privatizing the ATC system could
result in at least a 30% cost increase “if the provision of equivalent levels of ATC
services were provided by private contractors” (Sclar, 2003) and, presumably, no
additional fees were imposed to pay for it. What is known is the FAA’s budget, $16.4
billion in 2011 alone, of which $9.7 billion was earmarked for operations20 (Poole
and Edwards, 2010). While there is a general feeling amongst proponents of
privatization that the FAA costs too much, there appear to be no estimates of what
an appropriate cost would be for ATC. Likewise, privatization proponents feel that
the FAA cannot implement new technologies quickly enough and they usually result
in significant cost overruns (Poole and Edwards, 2010), yet it is unclear how this
would improve under a private entity, especially considering that most of those new
technologies are in fact currently developed and built by private contractors.

Would there be any measurable differences between a privatized ATC system
and the current system?
From a service perspective, it is difficult to imagine how different a private
system would be from the present system. Some organization, presumably the FAA,
would still be responsible for ensuring regulatory compliance and auditing the
safety and service provision of a private system. ATC clearances and phraseology
would likely not change. Safety standards such as required separation between
aircraft and between aircraft and terrain would not change. The way an ILS or GPS
approach works would not change. Though many hope that privatization would

20

“Operations” includes air traffic control and safety/certifications.
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reduce congestion and improve the efficiency of ATC, Sclar (2003) points out that
unmanaged growth in air travel in the US is as much to blame for congestion as any
deficiency in technology or infrastructure. Indeed, right now in the US, an airline
can essentially schedule as many flights as it wants into an airport and controllers
are expected to just deal with the traffic. Practical limits in the system include
runway capacity (a runway can handle x number of airplanes per hour under given
weather conditions and separation requirements) and gate or ramp space at an
airport (for example, an airline only has 12 gates available, or an FBO can
accommodate only 15 aircraft). Neither of these variables changes under a
privatized system, nor does it change system vulnerability to weather or security
threats. The recent sabotage of Chicago ARTCC21 shows how fragile the “hub-andspoke” system is to disruption, and privatization changes nothing there either.
Sclar (2003) raises another key point: “the general argument [regarding
privatization] is that the FAA, as a top-heavy bureaucracy, is incapable of making the
desired improvements itself, and that the private sector is the best substitute…It is
not immediately obvious why the problems of one (public) bureaucracy will not
reassert themselves in another (private) bureaucracy.” He states that the very
nature of ATC means it cannot be competitively bid: it is “too infrastructure
dependent and far too vital to our national interest to set up multiple competitive
systems.” Therefore, by definition, a private monopoly would be set up to run ATC,
and this monopoly would be insulated from the competitive market pressures that
privatization advocates promote as a benefit of transferring services to the private
21 In September 2014 a contract employee at Chicago ARTCC started a fire in the building, causing its evacuation and the
shutdown of airspace around Chicago.
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sector. It is difficult, then, to see what the point would be of privatizing ATC, unless
the goal is simply to reduce the size of government.

What are current federal air traffic controllers’ opinions on privatization?
This author spoke to two air traffic managers, a front-line manager, and a
controller for this study. One air traffic manager is at an FCT. The other air traffic
manager, front line manager, and controller were at an FAA facility. Interviews with
controllers at the FCT were not allowed out of concerns for staffing at the time of the
interview and company policy.
Tim Baribeau, manager of Double Eagle II (AEG) airport near Albuquerque,
New Mexico, a Federal Contract Tower, is a veteran controller with 35 years of
experience at facilities including military towers/approach controls and several FAA
facilities. Like many controllers who decide to work at contract towers, he wished
to earn income in addition to his FAA pension. Like everyone interviewed for this
paper, he agrees that there are no differences in services provided by contract
towers, nor would pilots know the difference between a contract facility and an FAA
facility. When asked whether there was an advantage to a contractor providing ATC
services over the FAA, he replied, “Other than cost savings because of fewer people, I
can’t think of any advantage to it.” Controllers at AEG make about $60,000 per year,
plus adjustments for holiday pay, overtime, night differential, and Sunday
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differential. Controllers at an equivalent FAA facility would be paid about $65,000
plus the same adjustments and locality pay22.
He cited the same numbers regarding the cost of FCTs versus equivalent FAA
towers as some of the other studies discussed earlier. According to him, those
savings come mainly from personnel. AEG employs only six controllers. It has none
of the staff support personnel that an FAA tower would have, such as an
administrative assistant, quality assurance, or staff support specialist. Mr. Baribeau
must perform all of those functions himself. He also does not have some of the
technological tools at his disposal that one would find at an FAA facility. For
example, his controllers must utilize paper timecards and Mr. Baribeau must
manually track and submit payroll numbers. AEG also does not have any radar
capability, so the controllers rely exclusively on eyeballs and binoculars. The FAA
could require these technological systems under the contract, but presently does
not.
When asked about the ability of ATC to be bid as a competitive service, he
acknowledged what some other authors cited in this paper have said. “It’s not like
Sears vs. Penny’s, so we’re not competitive in that respect.”
Jerry Muse was the acting Air Traffic Manager at Albuquerque International
Sunport (ABQ) until October of 2014. He is a 40-year veteran with experience at
several towers and approach controls, and he also served for a time as an instructor
at the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City. He agrees that pilots would not know the
difference between services at contract towers versus FAA towers, and that there is
22

Locality pay is a percentage added to base pay , based on cost of living. For example, locality for the San Francisco is
35.15% while Albuquerque is 14.13% (Office of Personnel Management, 2011).

PRIVATIZATION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES

41

no inherent advantage to a contractor providing ATC services although he does
think FCTs can provide a better service in the sense that they can be more accessible
to pilots wishing to do pattern work due to fewer air carrier and military operations
at those airports. But, as a general rule, he says that “air traffic is air traffic”
regardless of who is providing the service.
Mr. Muse also suggests that the companies who operate FCTs are vulnerable
to many of the same economic factors that affect the FAA. For example, although
FCTs are not subject to the congressional budget process in the same way that the
FAA is, their money ultimately still comes from the Federal Government and that
has a major impact on how they do business. For example, part of the
sequestration/government shutdown issue last year was the threat of closing all
Federal Contract Towers. Mr. Muse says, “Any facility subsidized by the FAA…is
sensitive to government budgeting issues.”
On the issue of whether or not ATC can be a competitive enterprise, Mr. Muse
cited the challenge in the United States involving the sheer scale of the ATC system,
the complexity and traffic volume, and the amount of infrastructure involved.
“When you look at contracting out ATC in the US…it’s a monumental challenge. I
don’t think there’s any other company besides the FAA that’s capable of doing it.”
He went on to say that the very nature of the service and the responsibilities
associated with it are inherently governmental. “This job is more than just a
paycheck; it’s a service to the public.”
Betsy Sutton is a front line manager at ABQ. Her 23 years of experience have
come from time at Albuquerque Center and ABQ. Her impression is that the
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government probably spends more money on contractors than it would if it
provided some services directly and that the contracting process takes too long, but
concedes that FCTs are cheaper because of fewer staff and lower salaries. However
like Mr. Muse, she points out that FCTs are subject to some of the same budgetary
problems the FAA faces, for example sequestration and threats of government
shutdowns. As far as an advantage for contractors providing ATC services, “The
only thing I can think is financial…I don’t think they provide better services.” She
does not believe that competitively contracting ATC services is possible, or
appropriate. “You can hire a contractor to mow your lawn…anybody can cut grass.
Not anybody can do this.”
Molly Maxton, a 30-year ATC veteran at Wichita (ICT) and ABQ, also
questions the value of privatizing ATC. On the one hand, contract facilities might
have an advantage from less bureaucracy. On the other hand, the FAA has an
advantage in that it is not motivated by profit. She concurs that pilots do not know
the difference in services provided by FCTs and FAA towers, but is ambivalent about
what advantages there might be under private sector provision of ATC services: it
could provide an opportunity to reduce cost through lowering pay and might allow
for a fresh start to ATC in the United States. But, “I still don’t think the tradeoffs
would be worth it.” What are those tradeoffs? Pressure to be profitable; which she
believes could lead to cutting corners and compromising safety standards. Also,
contract controllers do not enjoy the same job protections as FAA controllers. For
example, they cannot utilize anonymous safety reporting systems such as the Air
Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP). They can use the Aviation Safety Reporting
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System (ASRS) but are not afforded the same protections that pilots receive when
reporting deviations and safety incidents. Ms. Maxton feels that even if it were
possible for ATC to be a private system separate from the FAA it would be
detrimental to the system because “it’s better to have one entity for uniformity of
services.”

Conclusions and Recommendations
The main research question for this paper was: Would privatizing ATC in the
US lead to lower system costs and greater efficiency?
It is almost impossible not to discuss this issue in polarized terms, given the
current state of politics in the United States. Those in favor of small government, i.e.
Republicans, tend to be in favor of anything that purports to achieve that aim,
including privatization of ATC. Those who believe government should have a larger
role to play, i.e. Democrats, tend to favor retention of services within the federal
government. Perhaps the biggest problem in public discourse surrounding this or
any other issue right now is that the rhetoric from both sides often obscures the key
issues at play. Likewise, politicians and pundits seeking to win the war of sound
bites often grossly oversimplify very complex issues. ATC privatization is such an
issue, and in order to determine its actual benefits or drawbacks we must endeavor
to cut through the political noise and get to the facts at the heart of the debate.
The benefits of privatization in the case of air traffic control in the United
States are unclear. Proponents of privatization thus far have failed to provide a
compelling case that air traffic control costs too much: we know what the FAA
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spends and what other countries spend, but no one seems to have specific ideas
about what ATC should cost, particularly in the US, the world’s largest and most
complex system. How much is ATC worth? How much does one unit of ATC cost?
How much should one unit of ATC cost? No one has laid out those numbers, and
indeed it may be impossible to quantify exact costs. ATC is a service, in the same
way customer service or technical support is a service. How much does customer
service contribute to a company’s bottom line? We might broadly assume that good
customer service increases a company’s revenue while bad customer service
decreases it, but to assign a real dollar value is difficult. Finally, like a customer
service experience, airlines or GA pilots cannot “return” the service if they do not
like it or if the service was poor or unsafe. So instead the debate is over whether it
should be the government, airlines, the public, or some combination of stakeholders
paying the cost.
Furthermore, privatization advocates have failed to provide a good argument
as to why it would be beneficial to privatize such an enormous part of the US
transportation infrastructure. If the debate is over whether or not the government
should be involved in the production of goods and services, then this issue comes
down to how one views the role of the FAA in air transportation. If one thinks that
the FAA is the regulator and caretaker of the national airspace system (NAS) and
that the NAS is part of the nation’s transportation infrastructure, in just the same
way that an interstate is part of that infrastructure, and that infrastructure
facilitates economic trade, then it is appropriate for the federal government to
provide air traffic control services. If one thinks that ATC has a direct impact on the
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production of air transportation services, through expeditious or delayed service for
example, then it is not the government’s place to provide air traffic control services.
The reality is that both conceptions are true. The NAS certainly is a critical
part of the nation’s transportation infrastructure, and as such should be carefully
regulated by the federal government. ATC services directly impact the ability of NAS
users to provide their services and products to consumers. This is the crux of the
argument that ATC services should be separate from the regulator (the FAA) and
operated by the private sector. However, this may be a purely philosophical debate.
The cost savings from the transition from a government to a private monopoly are
unclear. If there is not a strong economic case for privatizing ATC, it seems to make
little sense to do so.
While a self-sustaining ATC system supported by some kind of user-fee
structure sounds enticing, the effects of those fees on travelers and the aviation
community as a whole must be taken into account. What will be the effect on flight
training at local flight schools and collegiate training programs? Prospective pilots
from all over the world come to the US for flight training. Could there be a reason
the come here instead of training at home? If the same kinds of user fees appear in
the US, will we lose those pilots? As for the potential reduction in ticket taxes paid
by consumers, it is possible that “Privatization of air traffic control would not
remove [airline ticket] taxes…Some portion of today’s taxes would simply become
user fees” (Airline Business Report, 2005). Since airline profits are highly elastic,
any increase in ticket prices could have an impact on the number of travelers and
airline profits, which would then impact hotels, car rental companies, and countless
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other components of the tourism and business industries that depend on affordable
air travel.
Poole (2014) cites a World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report
ranking of the US as 18th in the quality of aviation infrastructure, which he notes
includes ATC and airports. Privatizing ATC would move service provision into the
private sector but would do little to fix the infrastructure problems. Efficiency
improvements in the ATC systems of other countries are hard to define and the
results of the studies cited in this paper show that reduced staffing led to an
airspace closure in the UK and controller strikes in Australia over working
conditions, which caused delays and closures there as well. Efficiency
improvements from NextGen are hard to quantify at this time, as they are based on
the deployment of new procedures and technology that have yet to be completed.
Therefore, the answer to the main research question has to be that we do not
know if privatizing air traffic control services would lead to lower system costs or
greater efficiency. Costs may be reduced if user fees are introduced, but those fees
could lead to a reduction of services if aircraft owners and operators are unable
afford them. Privatizing ATC may be proposed simply as a way to reduce the size of
government, but that does not necessarily provide a benefit to the public. Other
studies on government privatization have shown that costs have not always been
reduced, and both federal and privately employed air traffic controllers agree that
there would be few, if any, measurable differences between a private system and the
current system.
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Alternative to Privatization
Instead of privatization, reorganization and consolidation within the existing
system would provide more predictable outcomes that may be just as beneficial, or
more so, than privatization. Mr. Baribeau (personal communication, January 17,
2013) and Mr. Muse (personal communication, February 4, 2014) both predict
future consolidation within the FAA. As mentioned earlier, radar information can be
sent from a radar site to anywhere in the country, so an approach control does not
necessarily have to be located near the airport it serves. This is already done at en
route centers. Albuquerque Center is located in Albuquerque, but provides service
to most of Arizona, New Mexico, and part of Colorado and Texas via a network of
radar sites whose information is sent to Albuquerque and displayed to controllers.
This kind of set-up allows 26 en route centers to control airspace throughout the US
and its territories, instead of needing one or more facilities in each state. Since
Southern California TRACON (SCT) opened in San Diego in 1994 approach control
services for all airports in southern California are provided from a single facility. A
second facility, Northern California TRACON (NCT), then took over services for
airports in the northern part of the state. Boston TRACON was moved from Boston
to Nashua, New Hampshire and controls traffic at Boston-Logan International
Airport and Manchester, New Hampshire with additional room to expand. Another
form of consolidation exists in the form of joint military-civilian use facilities.
Examples include Albuquerque Tower, which is located on Kirtland Air Force Base
but is staffed by FAA employees and provides tower and approach services for the
base and civilian airport. Grand Forks Approach, located at Grand Forks Air Force
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Base, is staffed by both military and civilian controllers and provides radar service
for the entire Grand Forks area.
The idea of consolidation is not new. The FAA considered facility
consolidation as part of its 1982 NAS Plan (Poole, 2006), but the proposals found
significant opposition in Congress. Similarly, the kind of consolidation undertaken
by Lockheed-Martin after it assumed control of the FSS contract had been
previously recommended by aviation stakeholders and the DOT Inspector General’s
office (Department of Transportation, 2007).
Slcar (2000) found that the cost of firefighting is based on population density,
and that the price differences between privatized and municipally-funded services
decreased as the population density increased. This phenomenon may prove
relevant when considering ATC privatization. If firefighting costs correlate to
population distribution and cost the same for public and private providers in highpopulation areas, but are cheaper for private providers in low-population areas,
then two outcomes are possible for ATC. One, cost of service provision in highvolume airspace and major airports may be the same as it is now and only smaller
facilities should be privatized, as has already happened to with the FCT program.
Two, instead of privatizing small facilities, they could be consolidated into larger
ones. For example, many small radar approach controls could be moved to larger
facilities, as discussed earlier in this paper. Research is already under way to do
basically the same thing with control towers, utilizing high-definition cameras and
remote communication systems, with one such tower already in operation in
Sweden (Saab, 2014).
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While privatization can be highly beneficial for some government services,
those services that are inherently monopolistic or that are related to infrastructure
tend to be less effective and in some cases quite costly when privatized. Given the
inconsistent results of government privatization efforts, the difficulties in
contracting out a highly complex public safety function, and the philosophical
problem of placing a vital part of national infrastructure in the hands of a company
that would constitute a private monopoly with little or no public accountability,
privatizing air traffic control may not be desirable. Furthermore, significant cost
reduction may not be possible without imposing some kind of user-fee system,
which has in Canada and Australia resulted in increased cost to aviation users.
Instead, reorganization of the FAA such as consolidating more facilities,
reform of the contracting process, and increased investment in airport
infrastructure (runways, terminals, gate and ramp space) would be more beneficial
and speed the modernization of air traffic control in the United States while
achieving many of the cost savings of privatization. If those savings can be achieved
without creating a new private monopoly, incurring the costs of transferring service,
and imposing a potentially burdensome user fee system on passengers and aircraft
operators, then these alternatives to privatization appear to be of greater benefit to
the government and citizens of the United States.
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